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ABSTRACT
As computing becomes ubiquitous, there is an increased interaction between
the computing devices. The transformation of the Internet of Computers
(IoC) into the Internet of Things (IoT) elicits the need to revisit security
schemes and to ask questions about their scalability. The need for such ques-
tions is further motivated by the direct connection between these constrained
devices and critical infrastructure like the smart grid.
In this thesis we explore the scalability of smart grid consumer-side IoT.
We look at how the extremely connected nature of IoT makes vulnerability
blooms much easier and ask if existing solutions like X.509 certificates scale
to large device populations. We also look at what information needs to be
exchanged between devices in order to provide strong and secure authenti-
cation.
The evaluation shows that existing schemes need to be given a second look
and in the rush to deploy solutions one must not plaster such schemes onto
the large population of devices that have been envisioned as a part of the
new age of computers. In particular we find that certificate schemes like
certificate revocation do not scale to large populations. We attempt to solve
the problem by a HMAC-based scheme.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In standard visions of the Internet of Things (IoT), there are a massive
number of things talking to each other. For this talking to be meaningful,
the listeners need to know who the talkers are.
Was it really my smartphone app that just asked my front door to unlock
and the heat to turn on (e.g. [1])? Was it really my car’s ECU that just told
my car’s brakes to engage—or was it an impostor (e.g., [2])? Was it really
Google Calendar that just asked my smart refrigerator for my password—or
was it an impostor (e.g., [3])? Was it really my washing machine that just told
my utility company that the machine is using a less power-hungry washing
algorithm? Thanks to the permeable nature of networked communication,
impersonation is always a concern.
For a representative example, consider the smart home, where consumer
IoT meets the smart grid. The interaction between these two domains elicits
the need for stronger security protocols that can protect the safety-critical
grid infrastructure. Smart home appliances are widely distributed, and given
their intimate connection to reality, their impersonation can sometimes turn
out to be very lucrative (consider ransomware for the home)—or at the same
time have devastating consequences.
The smart meter as the gateway: With over 50 million AMI meters in-
stalled across the United States, the smart meter is one of the most pervasive
smart devices along with the smartphone. In the vision of the consumer-side
smart grid, every house will have a smart meter that communicates with
other smart appliances in the house to make users more energy aware and
energy efficient. For example:
• Meters could have knowledge of occupancy of a particular home, and
turn off particular appliances to save electricity.
• The smart meter would receive real-time pricing information, and could
1
then relay pricing signals to the appliances.
• The smart meter could communicate demand response signals to these
appliances as well. Examples include switching off air conditioning for
20 minutes or reducing the heat by 5 ◦F over the next hour to help ease
stress on the grid.
• Smart meters communicate with certain gateway devices like Bidgely
[4] to help users get more detailed bills.
• A smart appliance would receive software updates from its manufac-
turer.
• A smart appliance would want to send repair diagnostics to the man-
ufacturer, to aid in quick fixing of the appliance.
• A smart meter could help coordinate charging of an electric vehicle with
other local usage—and perhaps even use the battery to store power.
This communication link between the smart meters and the smart devices
in a home increases the attack surface of the grid—and can extend the reach
of such attacks. Effective identification and authentication on these commu-
nication links is an important step toward mitigating this increased risk.
Scalable identity: The embedded systems in the IoT will likely have con-
strained computational power and memory, and (for systems not connected
to the wall) may have constrained electrical power as well. The communi-
cation channels between them may also be constrained. Thus, we need to
consider the engineering impacts of the supporting cryptographic technolo-
gies. For example, in prior work [5], we found that adding cryptographic
authentication to the BGP routing protocol (only a few tens of thousands of
entities) kills performance.
The need for such fast and lightweight authentication is also motivated by
the design requirements proposed by various smart meter certification spec-
ifications [6]. The specifications put a cap on the maximum energy used by
a smart meter, thereby making it important to have fast and power efficient
cryptographic schemes.
In [7], we considered some issues for the smart grid alone. Also, as we will
see in Chapter 3, popular but complex cryptographic algorithms may take
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unacceptably long to run on these constrained devices, forcing the need for
more lightweight cryptography.
Toward this end, this thesis makes the following contributions:
• We look at scalability challenges of the existing schemes for large IoT
scale populations. We specifically address the limitations of certificate
revocation.
• We provide an elaborate discussion of the namespace and cryptographic
complexity in the consumer-side smart grid, as an example of the IoT.
• We discuss two possible solutions to the relatively less explored problem
of namespace and cryptographic complexities, which could serve as a
starting point for future work in this direction.
The thesis is organized as the following
• Chapter 2 provides background required to understand the work.
• Chapter 3 illustrates the permeable nature of smart grid IoT and mo-
tivates the need for action.
• Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the scalability of current cer-
tificate revocation schemes.
• Chapter 5 discusses namespace and cryptographic complexity and dis-
cusses results for the proposed solution.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Ubiquitous computing is the notion of making compute omnipresent. Mark
Weiser, who coined the term, envisioned a world where the computer no
longer is a box with a keyboard and a mouse but an entity embedded in
objects that humans interact with everyday [8]. Rechristened as the Internet
of Things (IoT), and fueled by Moore’s law, this world is closer to becoming
a reality. And, while we may be a few years (and privacy battles) away from
achieving a Minority Report resemblance, IoT has started to take form in
the smart grid, the smart home and industry.
Authentication is the process of verifying an entity’s (hereby referred to
as a principal) claimed identity. The best example is a username-password
scheme where the username is the claimed identity and the password is proof
of identity. Another commonly used method for authentication is challenge-
response; often performed when stateless authentication is needed.
While authentication answers the question: “Who are you?”; the next
logical question: “What permissions do you have?” is answered by autho-
rization. Authorization typically requires an access rule that is specified in
access control lists. Although, we do not explore authorization techniques in
this thesis, we would like to point out that building decentralized, lightweight
mechanisms to check for these access rules is an open problem and an active
area of research in ubiquitous computing.
Proof of authentication is traditionally through something you know, some-
thing you have or something you are. Successful authentication is a pre-
requisite to the security triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability. A
principal needs to be aware of who it is sending information to (confidential-
ity), who it is obtaining state modifications from (integrity) and who it is
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allocating a resource to (availability).
While the need for a strong authentication scheme for the Internet of
Things seems very evident, work has shown that existing schemes do not
scale to large populations of devices [5], [7]. Also, in instances where real-
time, low-power performance is of the utmost importance, many a times
designers opt for no authentication over the heavy cryptographic primitives
used in computing systems today. This is evident in a 2015 Hewlett Packard
security report on the state of IoT [9] that shows that 80% of the devices
studied had insufficient authentication and authorization capabilities. In
this chapter we discuss some of the widely used authentication schemes in
distributed systems: how they work and how they scale. We also look at
the changes from regular distributed systems to the IoT and the proposed
authentication schemes for ubiquitous computing.
2.1 Authentication in Large-Scale Distributed Systems
In this section we look at two of the largest distributed systems: the web and
the cellular telephony system. While we do not discuss systems like Kerberos
[10] which use the Needham-Schroeder scheme [11], [12] of issuing short-lived
tickets, we assure the reader that our study of the these schemes shows that
they are not scalable solutions to large device populations.
2.1.1 Authentication on the web
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was established as a scalable means to
build the web. Every principal on the web was to have a globally unique iden-
tity or distinguished names. To enable this, X.509 certificates were created
that bind the unique names to public keys. In order to trust someone, there
was a need to look-up their certificate in a global registry. This led to the
formation of a Certificate Authority (CA), which was supposed to maintain
telephone book like entries of every unique name on the web. The original
vision for PKI was to have a single trusted entity act as the universal CA.
The CA was meant to be the universally unique authority to generate and
issue all certificates and its public key was the only key that any verifying
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entity needed to know. However, the logistical and economic unscalability of
this technique in the practical implementation has led to multiple CAs being
formed. This leads to complex trust paths and while they seem to work in a
somewhat broken pattern on the web today, this will not scale to the billions
of devices that will be a part of the IoT.
Figure 2.1: Server to node ratio vs. probability of failed validation requests
for OCSP model
Another major issue with PKI is the notion of revocation. Every certificate
that is issued has its validity limited by an expiry date. However, there are
cases where there might be a need to revoke a certificate prior to the expi-
ration date. Most revocations happen due to change in affiliation of the key
holder, cessation of operation or due to private-key compromise. For trust
to hold in PKI, it is important to make all nodes aware of these revocations.
Many certificate revocation schemes have been proposed, however, in the In-
ternet today, most major web browsers fail to check for revocation status.
The most commonly used revocation schemes are the Certificate Revocation
List (CRL), where the CA periodically publishes a list of revoked certificates
to its clients, and the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), where an
online check is made in real-time with a trusted entity. A recent experiment
we performed showed that we would need a large number of servers that
are continually online in order to have frequent and successful OCSP revo-
cation checking. This is shown in Figure 2.1. The continually growing size
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of CRLs has made them hard to read at the client side and this will only
get worse with a large population the size of IoT as revocations get more
frequent. OCSP, on the other hand, suffers from the fact that the trusted
server is many a times unavailable due to large number of requests. When
the Heartbleed vulnerability was discovered, more than 80,000 certificates
needed to be revoked. Imagine finding a vulnerability like Heartbleed in a
population the size of the Internet of Things and not checking for revocation.
We investigate this further in Chapter 4.
Soon it was realized that certificates may work for server side authentica-
tion on the web but presented many hurdles for client side authentication.
The main drawbacks of client side certificates are:
• Unique name: The larger the population of online principals gets,
the harder it is to give them unique names. Many argue that neither
is it possible to achieve global uniqueness even with the Internet size
population nor is it the most relevant parameter [13].
• User experience: Generating and using a certificate requires effort
and having the average user go through these steps do not help with
usability.
• Portability: Since certificates are public-private key pairs, there is no
way to extract the private key from say the desktop browser to use on
a smartphone such that the user has the same global identity despite
using different devices.
• Privacy: Once a user is associated to a certificate, any website can
request the user’s certificate. However, there may be times when the
user wants to maintain a hidden identity. How a person interacts with
Facebook would be totally different from how the same individual in-
teracts with a new unknown website for the first time. If a user were
to request multiple certificates to avoid using the same identity then it
becomes a user experience challenge as the user is presented with a list
of certificates to choose from every time a web page is visited.
Hence to avoid this process, the web uses passwords for client side au-
thentication. Recent work at Google has aimed at making client side certifi-
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cates more usable: origin bound certificates [14] are meant to work alongside
passwords to provide higher security from man in the middle attacks while
ensuring users retain the same user experience. Transport Layer Security
(TLS) [15] provides session-oriented authentication for the web. The popu-
larity of TLS and the returns associated with breaking it has led to it being
a high-value target for attackers [16].
2.1.2 Authentication in GSM
The GSM telephone network shows the use of embedded symmetric keys and
their use for authentication. One major drawback that is widely criticized
about GSM is their principle of security by obscurity. The encryption and
authentication algorithms are kept secret and not disclosed to the public
(which obviously did not work ).
Every user (U) gets a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) which is a smart
card that stores a unique 128-bit symmetric key ki. The shared version of
the key is stored in a database at the authentication center (A). Whenever
the user places a call the following steps occur:
U → A : callSetupRequest
A→ U : RAND
U → A : MACki(RAND)
The Message Authentication Code (MAC) is calculated using the A3 al-
gorithm which is stored on the SIM card. Another algorithm that is stored
in the SIM card is the A8 algorithm. This is used to compute the session
key kc.
kc : MACki(RAND)
Note that this is different from the earlier MAC due to the use of ta different
algorithm. This thwarts any replay attacks.
Subsequently, a stream cipher A5 is used to encrypt the call traffic using
the kc that is calculated in the earlier step.
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The algorithms, while meant to be secret, were leaked and this led to vul-
nerabilities being found and exploited. Also there is no notion of end-to-end
encryption in GSM security; the connection is decrypted at the base station
and re encrypted at the base station of the receiver. All communication
within the system is in plain-text. Also, to get a SIM card, the user has
to provide identification and fill out applications that are stored at the ser-
vice provider, which makes it a user experience challenge for large systems
like the IoT. These design flaws makes the protocol unscalable for the IoT
population.
2.2 Authentication in the New Age of Computers
Section 2.1 illustrated the work done in building authentication protocols to
identify principals in large-scale distributed systems. However, there are a
few new challenges that are introduced by the Internet of Things that make
authentication harder to perform.
• Servers are not always reachable: If a scheme like Kerberos were
to be used, when a new refrigerator in the house wants to communicate
with the AMI smart meter we need to have assurance that there is a
valid ticket presented during the transaction. How does the smart me-
ter that uses Zigbee talk to the Kerberos KDC? Does it use a gateway
router? How did it come to trust the router in the first place?
If a PKI-based scheme is to be used, every certificate would need to
have a valid certificate. In this case, how does the smart meter check
for revocation? If it is OCSP, then how does the smart meter talk to
the OCSP server? If CRL, how does the server at the CA make sure
that all the nodes in the network receive up to date CRLs?
• Secure transient association: While security is of top value in pro-
tecting these devices, a new problem arises due to the fact that owner-
ship of these devices in highly transient. What happens when a person
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sells their washing machine on Craigslist? What if a consumer buys
a new washing machine, how does that authenticate to the smart me-
ter? Every time a physical transaction occurs, there is a change in
the identity of the computer node. How does one rebind a new secure
identity to the node? Having a central service that keeps track of all
these transactions does not seem very scalable or usable.
In this section we explore two proposed schemes for overcoming these new
obstacles.
2.2.1 The resurrecting duckling security policy model
Figure 2.2: State diagram for the resurrecting duckling model
When a duckling hatches, it will recognize the first moving object, that
makes a sound, as its mother. This is called imprinting. This metaphor
is used to describe the resurrecting duckling security model [17], [18]. A
device that is powered on for the first time will recognize as its parent the
first principal that sends it a private key. In a process termed as reverse
metempsychosis, a device may then be made to forget the original parent and
adopt a new parent principal. The policy uses the following main references:
• The two state principle: The entity that is protected by the policy
can only be in two states: imprinted or imprintable (shown in Figure
2.2). In the imprintable state, it is ready to receive private keys from
any principal that might initiate a conversation. In the imprinted state,
it acts as a slave to the principal master.
• The imprinting principle: When an imprinting key is sent to the
entity from a principal, using a secure channel the entity is imprinted.
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While it might seem easy to do, setting up a secure channel may re-
quire heavy public key cryptography. If one of the principals is power-
ful enough to set up a key pair and broadcast the public key then this
can be simple. However, as an alternative the authors suggest using a
physical contact mechanism where key transfer of the imprinting key is
possible only if the two entities are in contact. This is one of the major
drawbacks of the model. It is not always possible to hold two princi-
pals against each other. Also, a dedicated attacker may broadcast the
imprinting key before the trusted principal can, thereby taking control
of the device, even if it may be temporary.
• The death principle: In cases where the control of the principal
needs to be transferred to another parent, the original parent may or-
der the death of the entity thereby putting it back to an imprintable
state. This can also be extended to revocation by making it a death
by predefined time.
• The assassination principle: The device must be constructed such
that it is uneconomical for an attacker to fake its death thereby putting
it in an imprintable state where the attacker may send the device his
private imprinting key. This requires some level of tamper resistance
in the devices.
The scheme also does away with the concept of globally unique names.
In the model, the duckling accepts the first principal as the mother without
digging into the identity of the principal. This is promoted as anonymous
authentication in the original paper.
2.2.2 The Blessings Security Model
The rate of growth of the Internet of Things with little consideration for
security has put major tech companies on alert. The blessings model, by
Google [19], is a security framework that tackles some of the major security
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challenges.
The blessings model describes methods for identification, authentication
and authorization. It promotes decentralized delegation of authority. The
following definitions will help us understand the model better:
• Identity provider: A well-known entity that most people can agree
to trust, e.g. Google, Microsoft or Facebook. This concept is derived
from OpenID Connect [20] and OAuth2 [21] used in the Internet cur-
rently.
• Principal: Each entity in the model has a public, private key pair. For
Alice, (Palice, Salice) is considered the key pair for a principal named
Alice.
• Blessings: Each principal has a set of hierarchical human readable
strings called blessings. For example, a Samsung refrigerator owned
by Alice will have the blessings: “samsung/products/refrigerator/123”
and “google/alice/home/refrigerator/1”. A principal is authenticated
based on its blessings. For example, all devices in Alice’s home autho-
rize access to any principal that is “google/alice/home/*”.
Blessings are a chain of certificates that are bound to the principal’s
public key and give the principal various identities based on the context
of communication. If Alice’s refrigerator needs to talk to the mainte-
nance shop about repairs, it will present its “samsung/products/ re-
frigerator/ 123” blessing whereas if it wants to tell the smart meter in
Alice’s house its power consumption, it will use the “google/alice/home/
refrigerator/ 1” blessing.
• Caveats: Not every permission is created equal. Permissions grant dif-
ferent levels of access. The model uses caveats to capture this property
[22]. For example, Alice may grant her house guest, Bob, permission to
only watch the TV. This way, when Bob tries to use the gaming con-
sole, he is automatically denied access. This is stored in the blessing
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certificate that Alice gives Bob. It will be of the form:
Palice identified as “google/alice/” says that Pbob identified as “google/
alice/ guest/ bob” until time t can access “google/ alice/ home/ tv”.
This notion of replacing a globally unique name with a name that is valid
in the local context was first proposed as a part of the Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [23] by Ron Rivest and Butler Lampson. This
scheme was meant to replace the centralized PKI architecture and remove
the notion of distinguished names. However, despite its success in the re-
search community, it was not adopted into practice due to economic reasons.
Now that we understand these terms let us look at an example interaction
of the bless operation. Think of Google as the root authority which creates
a self signed certificate, which is referred to as the blessing root. Now, since
Google is a registered identity provider, when Alice requests a certificate, it
checks her identity based on its certification practice statement and issues her
a certificate (containing her public key, Palice) signed using Google’s secret
key, Sgoogle. Now Alice has the blessing “google/alice/”. If Alice buys a new
television set, she may now bless the TV by creating a certificate for the TV
and signing it using her secret key Salice. The TV now has a new blessing:
“google/alice/hometv”.
Now, the thermostat in Alice’s house wants to show her a temperature noti-
fication on the TV screen, while she is watching her favorite Netflix show. The
thermostat has already received a blessing, “google/alice/thermostat”, from
Alice in the past. How does the thermostat authenticate with the TV? This
mutual authentication is achieved using a process similar to the SSL/TLS
setup. At the end of the transaction, both parties know each others’ blessings
and if the blessings fit their access control rules then authentication succeeds.
The trust is valid until one of the principals’ certificate expires. Figure 2.3
describes the process of authentication. Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used
to maintain forward secrecy.
Revocation is implicitly handled in the scheme by having short-lived cer-
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Figure 2.3: Mutual authentication in the blessings scheme
tificates. Having certificates with short validity also solves the problem of
transient ownership. If a device is sold to a new owner, it will automatically
request a new certificate from the new principal once the certificate expires.
The problem of online servers, however, is not completely mitigated. If
the root certificate expires, the principal will need to contact the identity
provider to get a new certificate. Increasing the validity of the certificate to
solve this problem will impact revocation. There is also the concern of key
management at constrained nodes. If a principal can have multiple blessings,
a constrained node may have to manage these blessings.
Having looked at the various existing schemes and challenges associated
with them, in Chapter 3, we move to our analysis of the IoT challenges that
motivate the problem further.
14
CHAPTER 3
MOTIVATION
The current Internet of Computers (IoC) is composed of devices rife with
security vulnerabilities. To help compensate for these endemic vulnerabili-
ties, the current IoC depends on a “penetrate and patch” security paradigm.
As holes are discovered, software is patched and eventually retired; as new
attacks emerge, new signatures are pushed to anti-virus software and firewall
rules are updated.
We already see IoT devices being built with the same endemic holes. In
this chapter, we seek to examine the security impact of this disruption, and
also to provide a foundation to examine the effectiveness to potential solution
strategies.
3.1 IoC to IoT
Many aspects of the transition from the IoC to the IoT have the potential to
disrupt the IoC’s security paradigms. Here we discuss some principal ones of
concern.
Invisibility: As responsible users know, it can be very hard to stay on top
of keeping software updated; as system administrators know, it can be very
hard to convince users to be responsible. When computers stop looking like
computers, we hypothesize the problem will become much worse.
Lifetimes: Physical devices such as appliances and light-switches will likely
live much longer than laptops and personal computers; e.g., washing ma-
chines may last more than a decade, and power grid equipment may last
many decades. Thus, we hypothesize that unpatched software will persist
much longer. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that devices may outlive
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their original ownership period—and may even outlive the company respon-
sible for maintaining the software.
As an actual example of the hazards of device lifetime and invisibility,
radiology machines with embedded computer containing old and unpatched
Windows operating systems led to an infection paralyzing a hospital’s IT
system [24]; as another example, air traffic systems based on even older
Windows 3.1 led to the November 2016 shutdown of the Orly airport [25].
Patchability: We hypothesize that devices in the IoT will be harder to
patch than devices in the IoC. One contributing factor is reduced network
connectivity—remote devices may be hard to reach over the network; to
patch the well-publicized security flaw in Jeep Cherokees, Chrysler needed
to physically mail USB drives to owners. Another factor may be the fact the
device software may be in unchangeable ROM or FLASH, leading to some
analysts warning about the emergence of forever-days. A 2014 Kaspersky
Labs’ study [26] showed that the CVE-2010-2568 vulnerability that was ex-
ploited by Stuxnet still remained un-patched on over 19 million computers
worldwide.
Device weakness: We hypothesize that the security contributions of anti-
virus will decrease in the IoT, as devices will be too weak to run AV (com-
pounded by the factors above reducing the degree and effectiveness of patch-
ing).
Consequences of compromise: We hypothesize that the intimate con-
nection of IoT devices to physical infrastructure will increase the damage
from successful compromise. Exploding gasoline tanks [27], radio broadcasts
crippling automobiles in transit [28], and blacking out northeast North Amer-
ica [29] are all much worse than not being able to buy things on Amazon for
three days.
Population scale: We hypothesize that the increased size of the IoT (e.g.,
many tens of billions, instead of millions) will also reduce the effectiveness of
penetrate and patch. The number of vulnerable systems will be larger, and
the speed with which patches can propagate may in fact be longer.
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3.2 Approaching the Problem
An absolute quantification of security, although useful in providing guaran-
tees to user, cannot be achieved. One cannot claim that the IoT architecture
is x% secure. However, a relative quantification is possible. A relative quan-
tification would suggest a certain improvement or a certain decline in the
security of a system. While current strategies to quantify the security of a
system come from pen-testing teams and security experts trying to break
into a system, a new trend of modeling security has emerged in the past
decade—evaluation approaches based on security metrics based and mod-
eling the attacker (script kiddie, serious hackers and nation states) along
with the cause-effect relationships between actions. In the future we hope
to build models that take into account the ability of the attackers. In our
ongoing work, we aim to relatively quantify the changes in security patterns
and metrics from the IoC to IoT.
To build these models, we look at the past: the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) list maintained by MITRE. We generated a list of all
reports containing specific user-provided keywords. We then parsed the list
of reports to obtain the aggregate number of vulnerabilities per year relating
to this keyword. We used the number of vulnerabilities reported per year to
create a curve of best fit (linear or polynomial). We then used this curve of
best fit to generate projections for the years 2020 and 2025.
Figure 3.1 shows the curve for server-side software; Figure 3.2 shows the
curve for browser-side software; and Figure 3.3 shows the curve for device
software.
3.3 Measuring Security Health
We want to reason about the security impact of some given number of un-
patched zero-days on the IoT.
We start by considering an individual device. At any given time, it may
be in one of three states:
• It may have no known vulnerabilities.
• It may have known vulnerabilities.
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Figure 3.1: Server vulnerabilities reported in CVE through 2015—and
projected to 2025
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Figure 3.2: Browser vulnerabilities reported in CVE through 2015—and
projected to 2025
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Figure 3.3: Device vulnerabilities reported in CVE through 2015—and
projected to 2025
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• It may be compromised.
An attack on a vulnerable device will lead to compromise, and a compromised
device may then launch attacks on the devices to which it is connected. A
patch issued to a vulnerable or compromised device will return it to healthy;
a healthy device will become vulnerable according to a stochastic process
derived from Figure 3.3. (In this initial model, for simplicity, we treat “vul-
nerabilities” of a device as an aggregate set instead of separate items with
separate patches.)
To consider the health of the overall IoT, we might initially measure (in
our model) the percentage of devices that are compromised. However, this
measure alone will not capture the notion of resilience to attack: just because
the devices are not currently compromised does not mean that a small focused
attack cannot cause disaster. So, instead, we will measure over time:
• the percentage of devices in the system that will become compromised
• versus the percentage of devices against which an attack is launched.
A low, flat curve indicates resilience; one that grows quickly indicates trouble.
3.4 Modeling Health in the IoT
We build our model on the Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [30] for-
malism. SANs are an extension to Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs). SANs use
graphical primitives to provide high-level formalism which allows for detailed
specification of performance models. It contains the four most important
components shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Graphical representation of SAN building blocks
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• Places represent the state of the modeled system. Places contain to-
kens that represent the marking of the place. Places are like variables
that contain the state or “value” of the system. Markings may either
represent the number of objects, as in the number of cars that need to
be washed; or markings may represent an object of a certain type, as
in the priority of a task. This allows for a lot of flexibility.
• Activities, timed or instantaneous, are actions that take place in the
modeled system over a period of time. Each timed activity has a time
distribution function associated with it. When an activity fires, it
causes a transition in the state of the system and thus changes the
marking of a place.
• Input gates control the firing of activities and define the changes in
marking that will occur after a transition takes place. Each input gate
has an enabling predicate and a function. While the enabling predicate
decides whether an activity must fire or not, the function defines the
marking changes that must occur post activity completion.
• Output gates are also used to define complex completion functions.
They only differ from input gates in that they can only be associated
with one case if the activity has multiple cases it can choose from after
it completes.
To model the IoT itself, we will consider the model shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: SAN for system health
• There are three places representing the three states of the model:
healthy, weak or compromised.
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• The markings in each place represent the number of devices in that
state.
• The gates govern the transitions and contain the functions that get
executed when an activity fires.
• The vulnerability discover activity is the rate at which vulnerabilities
get discovered by researchers and the security community. When a vul-
nerability gets discovered, there is a chance that the system is affected
by that vulnerability—in which case, it changes state from healthy to
weak. There is also a chance that the vulnerability does not affect the
system—in which case, it remains healthy.
• The patching activity is the rate at which patches are sent out after a
vulnerability has been discovered. A patch might either reach the sys-
tem or not. If the system is patched it goes from being weak to healthy;
if the patch does not reach the system it remains weak. Here we define
a patchability constant p as the probability that a patch successfully
reaches a peripheral device.
• The attack activity defines an attack on a system before it is patched.
We consider that an attack on a known vulnerability will always succeed—
thus going from the weak state to the compromised state.
Figure 3.5 shows the graphical representation of the SAN model that we
built. We hope to use this model as a starting point to answer questions
regarding the transition form IoC to IoT.
High-level formalisms like SANs allow for ease in specification of large-
scale systems. With a large model comes a large state space which may
take unreasonably long to solve using analytical solutions. Discrete event
simulation can be used to solve for such cases where the state spaces are
too large. One drawback of discrete event simulation is the fact that if the
desired measure of solving a large model is based on a “rare” event then the
result may not be accurate.
In our case, we use discrete event simulation to solve the model described in
this section. The fast growth of the Internet of Things population, the large
number if vulnerabilities discovered every year and the even larger number
of attacks on such connected environments makes it such that there are no
rare events in our model. Thus, simulation is a dependable choice.
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3.5 Initial Results
In this section we present the initial results of our analysis. We study the
system with a growth in the number of IoT connected devices, an increase in
vulnerabilities discovered and a raise in the number of attacks on the devices.
3.5.1 Parameter Choices
In our analysis we consider two variable inputs: the rate of growth of the
number of devices in the Internet of Things and the rate at which vulnera-
bilities are discovered. The vulnerability growth profile is based on the CVE
study described in Figure 3.3, which shows a steady rise in the number of
vulnerabilities discovered every year. The profile for the increase in popula-
tion size of the IoT is based on the intelligence study in Greenough [31]. This
profile is shown in Figure 3.6. The selection of the input parameters is based
on the intuition that as the number of devices in a highly interconnected
environment grows, discovered vulnerabilities have a larger surface on which
to spread.
Figure 3.6: Approximation of IoT population growth based on studies in
Greenough [31]
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the relative quantification of
security; hence our other parameters are conservative assumptions that help
us understand the spread of attacks in a highly connected environment. We
assume that every year an attack is launched against 10% of the devices in
the population. This is the attack rate used in the model. We also provide
a study for two cases of vulnerability patches: the first study assumes that
there is a patch for every vulnerability that is discovered that year, the second
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Figure 3.7: The number of nodes that get compromised per attacked node
over time for different patchability constants (p), which is the probability
that a patch successfully reaches a node
study assumes that only 90% of the vulnerabilities discovered have patches.
These provide the patch rate value to the model. We provide the results for
both these cases in this section.
3.5.2 Results
Figure 3.7 describes the results we obtained. The plot aims to find out
how many nodes are compromised when one node is attacked in a highly
connected environment.
The first study we performed was to see the impact of change in the patch-
ability constant. For this, we assume an ideal scenario where for every vul-
nerability that is discovered, a patch is issued. As we can see, even when
90% of the patches reach the nodes, there are still multiple nodes that get
affected when a single node is attacked. As can be seen for the cases where
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p = 0.75 and p = 0.5, as the patchability becomes worse, more nodes get
affected by a single failed node. This shows the high amount of dependence
in the IoT mesh network scenario.
The second study not only retards the patchability but also considers that
only 90% of the vulnerabilities have patches issued/discovered. In this case,
for every device that is attacked, potentially, more than 80 devices will be
compromised.
The main goal of this study is to provide knowledge of the fact that with
the Internet of Things, the probability that a patch successfully reaches every
device is going to reduce drastically. As the patchability gets worse, the
highly interconnected and dependent nature of the IoT would mean that a
single exploitation of a vulnerability on a single node would lead to various
other nodes becoming potentially compromised. While the results of this
study seem intuitive, the study motivates the problem and provides a starting
point for research in this direction, which is our goal. We also hope that
when we use our model to study other IoT communication architectures
with different levels of interdependence, we will have a better understanding
of the schemes that need to be implemented in order to avoid such spreads
of the attack.
Another takeaway from this initial analysis is the need for strong authen-
tication. In the face of vulnerable device neighbors it is important for in-
dividual hosts to have a need and identity based trust relationship with its
neighbors.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATING THE SCALABILITY OF
REVOCATION SCHEMES FOR THE
INTERNET OF THINGS
Public-key cryptography was born out of a need to have a method that al-
lowed for secure electronic key exchange in an open networked environment.
The use of asymmetric-key algorithms meant that now a node in the net-
work needed to know its own private signing key and the public verifying
key of every other node in the network. The number of keys to be known
was further reduced when digital certificates were introduced. Certificates
allow for the node to only know its own private key and the public key of a
trusted root. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the term used to describe
the mechanics used in establishing, maintaining, distributing and revoking
digital certificates.
Digital certificates are a form of digital identification. Servers may present
certificates to client computers or vice versa. In either of the cases, one entity
is asserting its digital identity to another. If for some reason an aspect of
the identity changes, there should be an update in the digital identification
by invalidating or revoking the digital certificate associated with that entity,
before re-issuing it. The Certificate Authority (CA) is entrusted with the job
of issuing, validating and revoking certificates in PKI.
Every certificate that is issued, has its validity limited by an expiry date.
However, there are cases where there might be a need to revoke a certifi-
cate prior to the expiration date. Most revocations happen due to change
in affiliation of the key holder, cessation of operation or due to private-key
compromise. For trust to hold in PKI, it is important to make all nodes
aware of these revocations.
Many certificate revocation schemes have been proposed, however, in the
Internet today, most major web browsers fail to check for revocation status
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[32]. With the envisioned smart grid and Internet of Things, the number
of nodes on the Internet are projected to reach 25 billion by the year 2020.
This population is five times the size of the current Internet [33]. While, the
current consensus seems to be that existing PKI techniques will scale for such
large population sizes, we think there is a need to rethink certificate schemes
for the high volume of low-power, low-computation capability devices that
will become ubiquitous in the near future.
This chapter presents our analysis of existing revocation schemes.
4.1 Problem Description
The need to trust communicating entities, while important in the Internet, is
enhanced in the Internet of Things due to the heavy interaction between the
cyber and the physical worlds. In this section we describe the main parties
involved with a certificate transaction and the two majorly used certificate
revocation schemes. Both, the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) method provide a method for a
node to validate if a certificate that has been presented to it has been revoked
or not.
4.1.1 The certificate revocation model
There are three main parties involved in the certificate revocation model.
1. Certificate Authority (CA): This is a trusted party that vouches for the
authenticity of the presented public key. The public key of the CA is
usually known by the browser/client. The CA issues a certificate that
consists of, in the most basic sense, the certificate serial number, the
public key of the subject, an expiry date and the address of the server
where revocation information may be found. The CA also, periodically
updates a directory server with all the nodes that have been revoked
since the last update.
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2. Directory server: This is an non-trusted party that maintains updated
certificate revocation information for the CA. It serves as a database
for efficient access by clients.
3. Client: The entity that requests validation of a certificate it was pre-
sented with, by the CA.
4.1.2 Certification revocation list
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [34], now the most common system, are
lists of revoked certificates a client can search to determine if a presented
certificate is still valid. The search process itself is not difficult, however the
lists themselves become untenably long. The CA will update and publish a
CRL at regular intervals. A link to the CRL is sent along with each certifi-
cate so that a client (browser) can examine the list to determine whether the
certificate it is evaluating has not been recalled.
As CRLs grow, the bandwidth and memory overhead necessary to maintain
CRLs across a network becomes significant. A modified CRL system, known
as delta CRL, attempted to address this problem by only sending updates
to CRLs across the network. Although this update significantly reduced the
overhead required, transmissions still exceeded one megabyte weekly in a
network of only 160,000 nodes. The overhead requirements on the multi-
million node Internet of Things would be much larger, yet the memory and
bandwidth available in IOT is significantly smaller; moreover previous work
has also shown that using revocation lists alone fails in only one million
properly-certified nodes and that revocation introduced significant security
holes in client-side SSL. This scalability problem will be significantly worse
in visions of the IOT.
4.1.3 Online certificate status protocol
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [35] is a newer method for check-
ing certificate revocation status. It is a server-based validation protocol that
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obviates the need for CRL transmission by requiring all users to transmit cer-
tificates to a centralized server for validation. It was designed to be a more
efficient method for certificate status checks than CRLs, allowing the client
computer to query a server for information about one particular certificate.
The OCSP server, usually called the OCSP responder, does the necessary
processing on its end and delivers a status message or assertion to the client
about a single certificate. OCSP responses vary in size but the most basic
kind of response, that is supported by all browsers includes: revoked, good
and unknown. With CRLs, the client was required to download a potentially
large file and then search through the file looking for an entry corresponding
to the certificate in question. In contrast, OCSP sends a small response re-
garding a specific certificate, reducing both the bandwidth required as well as
the amount of processing on the client. In theory OCSP’s centralized model
would alleviate the bandwidth and memory challenges of CRLs, however in
practice OCSP introduced a new set of equally challenging problems. Users
swamped the validation servers with requests, destroying real-time perfor-
mance and occasionally crashing servers.
Certificate revocation checking in PKI is very important to have secure com-
munication between two parties. Imagine an example where one of the com-
municating parties has its private key compromised. An attacker, with the
compromised key, could launch a man in the middle attack if the certificate
is not revoked or if the revoked certificate is not checked. Since the premise
of PKI is based on trust, it is very important to know whom to trust at all
times. Revocation means that a once trusted entity is no longer trusted and
hence all nodes should update their trust. In an ideal revocation scenario, as
a node is revoked, all other nodes are made aware of the revocation. However,
network and memory limitations have prevented this from being a reality.
The seemingly flawed nature of the existing revocation schemes has caused
major browsers to stop checking revocation status. The models described in
this chapter attempt to quantify the scalability limitations of these revocation
schemes. The ultimate goal is to evaluate whether the existing revocation
schemes can be used for a population of devices that is five times larger than
the current Internet, which seems to be the case with the envisioned Internet
of Things.
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4.2 Design Description
We studied some of the majorly proposed certificate revocation schemes [36],
[37], [38] alongside CRLs and OCSP in order to find the most important
aspects of a certificate revocation scheme. We found that the things that
mattered most to certificate revocation were:
• Vulnerability period: The time interval between when a revocation
is made and when the decision is made available to all the nodes in the
system. A good scheme minimizes the vulnerability period.
• Availability: If a scheme uses an online directory server to serve re-
vocation query requests to a set of nodes, the server should have high
availability.
• Scalability: A good scheme must easily scale to large network sizes.
• Overhead: What is the bandwidth requirement? What is the response
latency? Does the revocation information get stored on the device or
on the gateway or on the cloud? What is the computation cost on the
end device? A good scheme needs to consider reasonably the various
kinds of overhead on the system and manage it.
We also asked what the differences between IoT and IoC were in order to
better customize our scheme to the Internet of Things.
• Low variance: Unlike human users who visit a large number of web
pages a day IoT devices do not actually have to talk to a wide range of
servers. During the lifetime of a laptop or smartphone, the browser sets
up connections with a large set of web servers. However, a constrained
node generally just needs to talk to its cloud service provider. This
low variance means that not a large number of public-private key pairs
need to be stored on the physical device – ideally just one.
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• The MGC architecture: A very commonly used architecture that
has come to the forefront in the smart home environment is the eMbedded-
Gateway-Cloud (MGC) architecture (Figure 4.1). The need for low
power-consuming IoT communication protocols has allowed Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee and 6LoWPAN to flourish. However, these
devices need a gateway system capable of translating their data into
Internet packets. This gateway device is either an application on the
smartphone or a physical router.
Figure 4.1: The gateway architecture
4.3 Modeling Approach
In this section we present the various models we built to analyze the existent
revocation schemes.
We build our model on the Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [30] for-
malism. This has been described in Section 3.4.
In the following sections we evaluate the performance of both designs by
developing basic SAN models to capture their behavior. We use these models
to answer the following questions:
• How large do CRLs get?
• How often do the lists need to be checked?
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• What is the probability of a CRL request failing?
• How many transactions fail because of specified QoS requirements?
• What percentage of transactions incorrectly succeed?
• How do the two schemes compare against each other?
4.3.1 Certification revocation list models
We defined four SAN models to study the performance of Certificate Revo-
cation Lists (CRLs). They are briefly described below.
CRL size model
Figure 4.2: CRL size model
This model hopes to answer the question of how big the revocation lists
will become with time. The larger a list, the more the memory it will require
on the device. A lot of the Internet of Things devices, including smart me-
ters in the smart grid are low-memory, low-computation devices and having
a huge CRL would mean that it ultimately does not get checked.
In the model, as shown in Figure 4.2, there is a CA that issues certificates
at a rate of 1000000 a year. The use of a simulation solution allows us to
generate results without having to worry about the state space. The average
validity of a certificate is 1 year. A certificate then expires and is no longer
accepted by the browser.
33
An intermediate CA also revokes an average of 50 certificates a year. A
revoked certificate gets added to the revocation list. It is removed from the
revocation list if it expires.
CRL latency model
Figure 4.3: CRL latency model
In the current implementation of certificate revocation, if a CRL directory
does not respond to the CRL request within a certain timeout, the browser
ignores the CRL and presents the requested page. This is not a good imple-
mentation.
In this model, shown in Figure 4.3, we hope to find the probability that
a CRL is returned and checked in a certain time. This can be either used to
set a more effective timeout or to find the percentage of invalid transactions
that pass due to a timeout.
When presented with a certificate, either the node checks its cached CRL
for the revocation or it queries the directory server to get a new CRL if it
has been more than 6 days (avg. time after which CA publishes a new CRL).
In the model, we have assumed a constant time for the network delay. How-
ever, in reality the network delay would depend on the size of the CRL. As
the CRL size grows the network delay would increase. The processing time
and cache fetching time are very small compared with the network delay.
We find transient solutions to the solution at various intervals to time in
order to find the probability that the CRL has been successfully checked by
that time instant.
34
CRL request simulator
The CRL Request simulator SAN model (Figure 4.4) is used to simulate
simultaneous CRL update requests from several nodes. In this model, a
single server which can handle a fixed number of concurrent CRL requests is
simulated as a Processing Activity. The server processes requests at a rate
of
Number of Concurrent Requests ∗ Processing Rate
where the Processing Rate was a fixed quantity set to a reasonable value
100 requests per hour. We think that 100 requests per hour per thread
might be a reasonable processing rate because of the large CRL sizes. The
set of all available nodes which simulate CRL requests to this server, are
initially put into a place called N nodes at the start of the experiment. A
secondary activity called the CRL Update Activity is defined to generate
CRL requests from any of the available nodes with each node generating
requests at a particular rate called the CRL Update Rate. A successful or
an unsuccessful CRL request would include some associated network delay
and this delay is incorporated into model by fixing the CRL Update Rate
to a fixed value of 2 per hour. The specified rate value indicates that if
the request was successful, then average time taken to get the CRL list is
30 mins whereas if the CRL request failed, then the node would retry on
average after 30 mins. A generated CRL request is successful if the server
is not already busy, i.e. the number of concurrent requests currently being
served is less than a maximum allowed limit. Every successful CRL request
is put into the N Concurrent Requests queue at the server for processing
and the node which issued this request is removed from the set of available
nodes. Unsuccessful requests are simply ignored and the node tries again.
At the server, once a CRL request has been processed, the list is held at the
corresponding nodes for an average Hold Period which is currently set to
6 days. CRL Hold activity accomplishes this task and it fires at a rate of
Number of Served nodes∗Hold Period and puts nodes back into the avail-
able list. We do not define a separate place for the number of served nodes
but instead calculate this value using the total number of nodes, the number
of available nodes and the number of concurrent requests being served.
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The main purpose of this model is to study for a given Server-To-Node-
Ratio (STNR), i.e. for a specified number of nodes sending CRL requests
to a single server, how many requests would succeed and how many re-
quests would fail. This is easily calculated by defining a reward variable
P Max Concurrent Requests which is the probability that the server can-
not accept anymore requests.
Figure 4.4: CRL request simulator
Transaction validator
The Transaction Validator model (Figure 4.5) is used to study the outcome
of a given single transaction between two initially valid nodes. In the tradi-
tional CRL architecture, nodes may not always have the most recent cached
copy of CRL lists. Thus if a node involved in the transaction is revoked and
the CRL list has not yet been updated at the other node, the transaction
may succeed incorrectly. We use this model to obtain the probability that a
given transaction would succeed incorrectly.
In our model, for the given transaction, the time at which it is executed
is considered to be an event which can occur at a random time in the future.
There are several events which could occur before or after the transaction is
executed. The nodes involved in the transaction could get revoked after a
random interval of time. The nodes involved in the transaction could also is-
sue CRL requests repeatedly and hold the CRL lists once they are obtained.
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These events are modeled as independent activities with separate rates.
Revocation Activity simulates the process of node revocation. Usually, one
node involved in the transaction sends a request and the other node validates
the requesting node before responding to it. The Revocation Activity fires
at a fixed Revoke Rate which is the rate at which the requesting node could
get revoked. To study the worst-case scenario behavior, we took a pessimistic
approach and set a reasonably high average revocation time of 15 days.
Transaction F ire activity simulates the process of executing the transaction.
A transaction is executed after it has been fired. The CRL Update Activity
simulates the process of issuing CRL requests at the validating node. It
fires at CRL Update Rate. Once the CRL Update Activity completes, the
issued CRL request may succeed or fail probabilistically. The probabilities
associated with the success or failure of a CRL request are obtained from
the previous model. Thus for different STNR values, we can compute the
probability of incorrectly succeeding transactions. A successful CRL request
would enable the CRL Hold Activity which simulates the process of holding
the received CRL list for a while before re-issuing a new CRL request. An
unsuccessful CRL request would simply result in re-tries.
When the CRL request activity completes, the model checks whether the
requesting node has been revoked. If so, it indicates that transaction would
fail because the revocation has been sensed at the validating node. Subse-
quently, when the transaction fires, the model checks whether the requesting
node has been revoked and if so, whether the revocation was sensed. If the
requesting node was revoked and it was not sensed, then the transaction is
assumed to have succeeded incorrectly. We define a reward variable to detect
this condition. For our evaluation, we used a transient solver and evaluated
the reward variable after a long period of time. We were unable to use a
steady state solver directly to compute this probability because the transac-
tion outcome states in the model are absorbing in nature i.e. they have no
outward transitions.
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Figure 4.5: CRL transaction validator
4.3.2 Online certificate status protocol models
We defined three SAN models to study the performance of Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP). They are briefly described below.
OCSP latency model
Figure 4.6: OCSP latency model
Unlike, in CRLs, everytime a certificate is presented, the node verifies its
revocation status with the OCSP directory server. Also, the size of the re-
quest and response are capped at a maximum in order to allow for bandwidth
restrictions. The current max is 20480 bytes. Also, the default OCSP time-
out is 10 seconds. If either the size of the response is greater than the max or
the request times out, the browser ignores the revocation status and presents
the web page.
The model shown in Figure 4.6 assumes that the processing time for the
38
response is negligible. This is a valid assumption since the response only
contains a status of revoked, valid or unknown.
Transaction request simulator
The transaction request simulator SAN model (Figure 4.7) is used to simu-
late transaction validation requests between all participating nodes. The set
of all available nodes which participate in transactions are initially put into
a place called N nodes at the start of the experiment. A transaction can
occur between any two nodes. An activity called Transaction Generator
is defined to generate transactions between two nodes at a particular rate.
The rate at which the CRL update requests are issued is [N nodes− >
mark()]2∗Transaction Generate Rate. We have currently set the Transac-
tion Generate Rate to a fixed value of 12 hours to indicate the average
time between two transactions a node participates in. When a transac-
tion is generated, a request for validation is sent to the server. There is
a single server which can handle a fixed number of concurrent requests. If
Number of Concurrent Requests is less than the maximum allowed limit,
the server can handle the request is processed it. Else the transaction simply
proceeds irrespective of certificate validation. The server processes requests
at a rate of Number of Concurrent Requests∗Processing Rate, where the
Processing Rate was a fixed quantity set to a reasonable value 1000 re-
quests per hour. We think that 1000 requests per hour per thread might
be a reasonable processing rate because there is no transmission of list in-
volved and its a simple lookup by the server. Once the request is served, the
transaction starts. The rate at which a transaction completes is defined as
Number of Transactions in Progress ∗ Transaction Complete Rate.
The Transaction Complete Rate is currently set to 6. This means that
on average a transaction completes in 10 minutes. Once the transaction is
complete, the nodes go back into the place N nodes i.e. they can start par-
ticipating in other transactions.
The main purpose of this model is similar to that of the CRL request simu-
lator model, i.e. to study for a given server to node ratio, how many requests
would succeed and how many requests would fail. This is again easily calcu-
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lated by defining a reward variable P Max Concurrent Requests which is
the probability that the server cannot accept anymore requests. The reward
variable is evaluated at steady state using an iterative steady state solver.
Figure 4.7: OCSP request simulator
Transaction validator
The transaction validator model (Figure 4.8) is used to study the outcome
of a given single transaction between two valid nodes when OCSP is used
for certificate validation. It is similar in many ways to transaction validator
model described earlier and is used to answer the same questions. In the
OCSP architecture, however, the server may not always be able to serve a
validation request. If a revoked node participates in a transaction and the
server is busy, then the transaction proceeds anyway and succeeds incorrectly.
Similar to the earlier transaction validator model, for the given transaction,
the time at which it is executed is considered to be an event which can occur
at a random time in the future. The nodes involved in the transaction could
get revoked after a random interval of time. This can happen before or after
the transaction is executed. These two events, i.e., a transaction and a revo-
cation are modeled as independent activities with separate rates.
Revocation Activity and Transaction F ire activities fire at theRevoke Rate
and Transaction F ire Rate respectively. The Transaction F ire activity
simulates the process of executing the transaction. There are two cases to
consider after this activity completes, namely the validation server could be
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busy or not. In case the server is busy with the probability calculated in the
previous model, the transaction just goes ahead. Now if the initiating node
has been revoked then it leads to an incorrectly successful transaction. How-
ever if the initiating node was not revoked before the transaction is executed,
then the transaction succeeds correctly.
We defined a reward variable to detect the condition where a transaction
incorrectly succeeds. For our evaluation, we adopted an approach similar to
the transaction validator model described earlier and used a transient solver
and evaluated the reward variable after a long period of time.
Figure 4.8: OCSP transaction validator
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Certification revocation list model
Our latency analysis on CRLs produced the cumulative distribution function
shown in Figure 4.9. It is evident from the model that setting a timeout
below 10 seconds, which is the average now, would mean that 20% of the
transactions would timeout. As we go higher, the percentage of transactions
that fail due to latency falls but the timeout then becomes too big and would
affect user experience.
The study on size of CRL lists showed that in steady state 33% of the
issued certificates are revoked. This is disturbing considering the memory
constraint of devices. For a population size of 25 billion this means that the
CRL would have about 8.25 billion revoked keys. This means a file size of
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264 GB considering a key size of 256 bits. There is no way this is a scalable
option.
Figure 4.9: Cumulative probability distribution function of CRL checking
latency
Figure 4.10 shows the plot of probability of failure vs. STNR. Here the
probability of failure is the probability of a CRL request from a node to the
server failing. As can be seen from the plot, as STNR decreases, i.e., in our
case here the number of nodes for a single server increases, the probability of
a CRL request failing increases as expected. This is so because the number
of requests increase with more number of nodes, whereas there is still a single
server to cater to them.
Figure 4.11 shows the plot of probability of a transaction succeeding in-
correctly vs. STNR. This is an interesting result to observer for CRL model.
The probability of a transaction incorrectly succeeding remains nearly the
same for different STNR values we used in our analysis of the model. This
shows that a revocation not being sensed and a transaction proceeding in-
correctly is not influenced by the number of nodes we did our analysis on.
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Figure 4.10: STNR vs. probability of a CRL request failing for the CRL
model
Figure 4.11: STNR vs. probability of incorrectly succeeded transactions for
the CRL model
4.4.2 Online certificate status protocol model
OCSP was originally created to remove the latency and bandwidth issues
that were presented by CRLs. This was very evident even in the latency
model that we created. Figure 4.12 shows that almost all the transactions
succeed in under a second. Thus, the percentage of transactions that fail due
to latency in an OCSP setting in almost zero.
Figure 4.13 shows the plot of probability of failure vs. STNR. Here the
probability of failure is the probability of a validation request from a node
to the server failing, due to the server being busy. As can be seen from the
figure, as STNR decreases, the probability of a validation request failing in-
creases as expected. However, the growth is much higher when compared to
the CRL model which shows that OCSP is more susceptible to servers being
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Figure 4.12: Cumulative distribution function of OCSP latency
overwhelmed.
Figure 4.13: STNR vs. probability of failed validation requests for OCSP
model
In Figure 4.14, we plot of probability of a transaction succeeding incorrectly
as STNR is varied. A transaction succeeds incorrectly when the transaction
proceeds without validation due to the server being busy, and the transaction
initiating node has been revoked. The probability of a transaction incorrectly
succeeding increases as STNR decreases. Higher number of nodes leads to
more transactions and higher number of validation requests to the server.
Due to the limited capacity of the server to handle requests an increasing
number of transactions proceed without validation and hence the probability
of a transaction incorrectly succeeding increases. This is in contrast to the
CRL model where the probability almost remains constant thus indicating
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that OCSP is more sensitive to the server’s capability and the number of
nodes in the system and may not be a viable, scalable solution. The require-
ment of secure servers makes this problem worse since that means a lower
number of servers which means that in most practical cases of OCSP imple-
mentations, we would be dealing with the red region of Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: STNR vs. probability of incorrectly succeeded transactions for
OCSP model
The work in this chapter illustrated that existing certificate revocation
models, designed as a part of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) do not scale
to large populations. There is a need to look at other namespace complexities
that arise with certificates and to look for schemes that scale well. We look
at this in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
SCALABLE IDENTITY FOR SMART GRID
IOT
For secure interaction, devices in the smart grid need to know to whom they
are talking. Unfortunately, we have seen in the incipient smart grid and IoT
a rush to deployment which leaves glaring holes here. Several exploits have
been demonstrated including home cameras sharing private images with any-
one [39]; insurance dongles in cars accepting software updates from anyone
[40]; a person maliciously changing the temperature in an ex-spouse’s bed-
room [41]; home alarm systems allowing anyone to intercept and alter alarm
messages [42].
Making things even more complicated is that a globally unique name may
not suffice for the listener. What attributes do listeners need to know? Who
is in a position to witness these attributes? When does it become Joe’s
washing machine? When will the binding change? What if Joe sells the car
or moves out of the apartment? How would this communication of nam-
ing and attribute data happen? How broad or narrow are the patterns of
communication that need to carry this naming and attribute data?
Attributes: For example, in the consumer-side smart grid, consider a
basic smart appliance. If it is talking to an external party, the external party
might need to know what general type of appliance it is, what its make and
model are, who owns it, and the physical place it resides. The appliance may
need to know who the external party is, such as: the manufacturer, a duly
authorized repair person, the utility currently providing electricity to that
household, or the Google calendar.
In scenarios where appliances talk to peer appliances, they need to know
if this is really an appliance of a certain type, and also that the peering
relationship exists (we are in the same household or perhaps even the same
room together).
In scenarios where a smartphone or laptop controls devices, this controller
needs to know it is talking to the right devices, and vice versa.
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In electric vehicle scenarios, a car and its charging infrastructure need to
authenticate each other; the charging infrastructure needs to know whose car
it is, for billing, for scheduling when the charge needs to be complete, and
possibly to know whether the car battery can be used as back-up for the grid.
Again, in all these situations, a simple unique global identifier (e.g. IPv6
address) does not suffice to tell the relying party what they need to know—we
need names that communicate the appropriate ontology and attributes.
Lifetimes: In some sense, we can formalize an attribute as tuple (P,O,∆):
property P holds for the object O (initially, the object at the other end of
the communication), for time ∆ (initially, from right now). Looking at the
above discussion, we can see the need for many types of attributes in a smart
home.
Some are basic identity: this P will always bind to this O. This will always
be this specific tire pressure monitor, or this specific engine control unit, or
this refrigerator made by GE. Someone present at the birth of this device
would be in a position to assert the binding of P to O, and the binding would
hold for the life of the device.
However, other attributes depend on a more dynamic “ontology of associa-
tion”. How did this device come to be in this household? How did these two
devices come to be in the same household? Does an appliance (or a human)
change households? With what utility did the user contract? Has the tire
been removed—and perhaps even sold to someone else? The likely witnesses
here may even more distributed and varied—and the time interval in which
the P,O binding holds may be much less than the lifetime of the device.
This latter case opens up another can of worms: How does a relying party
know this witness is in a position to make this assertion?
5.1 Proposed Architectures
To explore scalability, we will thus consider two kinds of identity for each
entity:
• Core identity: This would tell us that an appliance is of a particular
type (e.g., washing machine of type x).
• Association attribute: This would tell us who or what an appliance
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is associated with (e.g., washing machine in Bob’s apartment).
We will need cryptographic tools and a trust calculus so that entities can
prove they have possess such identities, entities generating these assertions
about other entities’ identities may themselves have supporting assertions
testifying that they can do this, and relying parties will have some set of
rules about how they can infer a conclusion given a set of assertions and
some core axioms.
A natural approach (and one often suggested for the smart grid) is to use
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Each entity would have matching public
key and private key, and an entity can issue a digitally signed certificate as-
serting something about the public key of another entity. In a basic scheme,
a single Certificate Authority (CA) issues certificates, any relying party who
knows the CA’s public key (trust root) can verify a certificate, and a cer-
tificate holder proves it matches the certificate by doing something with the
corresponding private key. This approach can also extend to chains of cer-
tificates (with appropriate inference rules for what these chains mean).
An interesting alternative approach is to use macaroons [22]. A macaroon
consists of a public part—a random nonce and a set of additional data ele-
ments called caveats—and a private part—the HMAC value generated with
a symmetric key on the public part. The caveats enable complex assertions
like “trust this as long as it satisfies these caveats”. These caveats form the
public part of the macaroon. Instead of a certificate, entities have the public
part of their macaroons; instead of key pairs, entities have the private part
of their macaroons. Macaroons can chain together; for example, an entity E1
with public macaroon M1 and secret K1 can use K1 to generate a macaroon
M2, K2 for entity E2, and so on. A relying party which knows the secret
key at the root of a macaroon chain can derive the private parts of all the
macaroons along the chain—and thus share a secret with holder of the final
macaroon.
Figure 5.1 sketches these two approaches. We now explore applying each
one to the smart grid identity problem.
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Figure 5.1: (A) With PKI, a entity exhibits a certificate to prove its
identity and uses its private key to authenticate itself to any relying party
knowing the trust root public key; (B) with macaroons, a entity exhibits a
macaroon to prove its identity and uses this shared secret to authenticate
itself to a relying party knowing the trust root secret key; (C,D) both
approaches can be chained
5.1.1 Using PKI with attribute certificates
With PKI, we can have a trust root certify a CA at the utility and at each
appliance manufacturer. The appliance manufacturer would issue an identity
certificate to each appliance; the utility would issue an identity certificate to
each meter. Each meter could then issue an X.509 attribute certificate [43],
[44] to its co-located appliance, establishing the association. Figure 5.2 shows
this trust flow.
Device Registration: When a device shows up in a house, it would
present its identity certificate to the smart meter and prove knowledge of its
private key. The smart meter checks the validity of the certificate, and then
grants an attribute certificate which specifies that the device is associated
with this specific meter.
Revocation: Every certificate that is issued has its validity limited by an
expiry date. However, there are cases where there might be a need to revoke
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Figure 5.2: Using identity and attribute PKI for smart appliances
a certificate prior to the expiration date. Most revocations happen due to
change in affiliation of the key holder, cessation of operation or private-key
compromise. For trust to hold in PKI, it is important to make all nodes aware
of these revocations, otherwise, relying parties may falsely conclude a binding
exists when it does not. The most commonly used revocation schemes are
the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), where the CA periodically publishes
a list of revoked certificates to its clients, and the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP), where an online check is made in real time with a trusted
entity. The continually growing size of CRLs has made them hard to read at
the client side and this will only get worse with a large population the size
of IoT and smart grid as revocations get more frequent. OCSP, on the other
hand, suffers from the fact that the trusted server is many a times unavailable
due to large number of requests. Other schemes like NOVOMODO [37] and
Certificate Revocation Trees (CRTs) [36] exist but they do not scale even
for the Internet size population. Many certificate revocation schemes have
been proposed, however, in the Internet today, most major web browsers
fail to check for revocation status. When the Heartbleed vulnerability was
discovered, more than 80,000 certificates needed to be revoked. Imagine
finding a vulnerability like Heartbleed in a population the size of the smart
grid and not checking for revocation.
Cryptographic Considerations. Public key cryptography is largely
susceptible to brute force factoring attacks on keypair moduli. However, for
moduli of at least 2048 bits (for RSA), the amount of computation required
to perform brute force and crack such large keys is not in the reach of attack-
ers. (Unfortunately, constrained devices have been shown to have crackable
private keys due to being generated with predictable randomness [45]—an
orthogonal problem.)
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We make use of RSA, DSA [46] and the elliptic curve Ed25519 [47] in our
experiments.
5.1.2 Using macaroons
With macaroons, we can have a trust root create an introduction macaroon
M1, K1 introducing a given utility’s meters to a given appliance manufac-
turer. The utility would embed the introduction M1, K1 with each meter.
The manufacturer would use K1 to generate a manufacturer’s identity mac-
aroon M2, K2 for each appliance, establishing what kind of appliance it is.
When an appliance arrives in a house and presents M2 to the meter, they can
set up a mutually authenticated channel using the shared secret K2. (Using
HMACs instead of digital signatures requires the manufacturer know this
introduction key K1—however, the worst it can enable the manufacturer to
compromise introduction of their own appliances).
If the utility also has a root secret RU and uses that to give each me-
ter a utility’s identity macaroon M3, K3, then the meter can then issue its
own macaroons. For example, after having authenticated appliance via the
introduction and manufactuer identity macaroons, the meter can issue the
appliance a M4, K4 specifying both the type and location of the appliance;
the meter can also issue a pairwise introduction macaroon to pairs of ap-
pliances at the house so they can establish authenticated sessions between
themselves. Figure 5.3 shows these trust flows.
The lifetimes of these macaroons would correspond to the lifetime of the
bindings to which they testify.
Shared secret secure channel: Since there is a macaroon HMAC value
that is shared between two appliances, or an appliance and the smart me-
ter, or the smart meter or any appliance and the manufacturer themselves,
we can follow the NIST guidelines [48], and use a Key Derivation Function
(KDF). This KDF could be used to generate a key for the purpose of the
symmetric key channel. We identify the following methods could be used for
this purpose: bcrypt (72 bytes) [49], scrypt (64 bytes) [50] and argon2 (68
bytes) [51]. The standard AES encryption uses 256-bit keys (32 bytes).
The key generated by the key derivation function will have to be truncated
to 256 bits to be used in AES encryption or Simon/Speck Ciphers (which
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Figure 5.3: (A) To use macaroons to let a smart meter authenticate a
particular type of smart appliance, a global root creates M1,K1 to let a
manufacturers’ devices introduce themselves to a utility’s meters; (B) if the
utility had also given the meter its own identity macaroon beforehand, the
meter can use that to to then issue a combined identity and association
macaroon to the appliance
have been optimized for constrained devices [52]), which are both symmetric
encryption schemes. In order to check the integrity of the messages being sent
over the secure channel, we use an HMAC with MD5 and with the macaroon
secret K as the initial password to generate the HMAC.
Cryptographic considerations: The parties generating the initial mac-
aroons, which are namely the utility provider and a central authority, need
to keep their secret keys secret, and only they can verify the correctness of
the macaroon completely.
The security of the algorithm largely depends on the security of the HMAC
algorithms itself. The strongest attacks against HMAC are based on the fre-
quency of collisions, birthday attack and the timing attack could be used
for improperly secured systems. The birthday attack is impractical for rea-
sonable hash functions [53]. Even the MD5 and SHA-1 hashes, with known
lack of collision resistance, do not show any vulnerabilities when used as a
message authentication code [54], [55].
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Revocation: Macaroons contain a validity caveat in them, which is imple-
mented using epoch counters, beyond which the macaroon would no longer
be valid.
The utility provider minting these macaroons, signs the macaroon with
the validity caveat set to a lifespan of a few days. This macaroon is then
granted to the smart meters. The smart meter could further attenuate the
macaroons and transfer them to other appliances in the house.
Once the macaroon expires, the validity caveat makes the macaroon un-
usable. Thus, a device presenting an expired macaroon is no longer trusted.
Unlike Certificate Revocation Lists, where the utility, the smart meter and
the appliances would need to check against a blacklist of invalid certificates,
there is no need to maintain such state in a macaroon-based implementation.
This makes it a memory and network friendly replacement.
In our next section we discuss the performance of each of the above algo-
rithms. We also discuss the performance of attribute certificate-based algo-
rithms and the macaroons in constrained devices.
5.2 Results and Discussion
In this section we discuss the performance of the smart meter in various
scenarios.
The major difference between the macaroons and the PKI-based scenario
is the fact that the PKI Identity and attribute certificates make use of asym-
metric cryptography, where as macaroons make use of HMAC. Intuitively,
we would think that an HMAC-based scheme should take much lesser time
than an asymmetric scheme. We will discuss the performance further in this
section.
We are concerned about testing the createAttrCert and verifyAttrCert
methods of the PKI-based model and the createMacaroon and verifyMac-
aroon methods of the macaroon model.
The createAttrCert method computes a hash of the certificate contents,
and then creates a signature using RSA, DSA or Elliptic Curve Ed25519.
The verifyAttrCert algorithm verifies the signature and the hash for its cor-
rectness.
The createMacaroon method mints a macaroon by performing a sequence
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of nested HMACs using one of the many hash functions widely available and
the verifyMacaroon performs a similar operation and verifies the final HMAC
value of the macaroon by performing the same operation.
The certificates and macaroons are minted at the initial server which has a
good computational capability, and at a constrained device such as a smart
meter. In the past our project colleagues have developed a smart meter
research platform [56] in order to obtain realistic results for experiments per-
taining to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The platform is an
embedded system that uses a metering IC for power readings and a front-end
microcontroller (TI MSP430) which runs applications for the smart meter.
The platform also has a Zigbee RF module for communication between other
such smart meters and to the local data collector unit. The micro-controllers
and system design used to build the platform are commonly used in commer-
cial meters that are deployed worldwide. We have modified the firmware on
the smart meter research platform to incorporate the macaroons model. We
also run our tests on a Raspberry Pi 2, and on a GNU/Linux server with a
3 GHz Intel Xeon CPU running at 1 GB of RAM.
We make use of the Networking and Cryptography library (NaCl) and the
PyCrypto libraries in Python in order to perform these experiments.
We first test our PKI-based scheme by running the createAttrCert and
verifyAttrCert methods on the above mentioned server and Raspberry Pi.
In Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 we can see that the time taken for the tasks
of creating and verifying attribute certificates. We vary the key size and
the algorithm in order to check for the time taken to generate the attribute
certificates. A granting authority would have to generate a keypair, then sign
the certificate. For our experiments, we use a public RSA exponent value
of 65537 and vary the private modulus length. Elliptic Curve Ed25519 is a
high-speed signature algorithm, with fast key generation and small signatures
of size 512 bits [47].
We then test our macaroons-based model, by testing our methods to create
and verify the macaroons. In a macaroon-based model, the smart meter
would have to add caveats and verify the macaroons it would receive. Hence,
we test the macaroon-based model on the server (Table 5.3) and Raspberry
Pi for different cryptographic hash algorithms (MD-5, SHA-1 and SHA-256)
for computing the HMACs.
From these results, we can see that in the smart grid, it would be time
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Table 5.1: Varying RSA modulus length, elliptic curve Ed25519 key size
and DSA key size for PKI attribute certificates on a server
Protocol Key length createAttrCert verifyAttrCert
RSA 1024 bits 40.26 ms 0.10 ms
RSA 2048 bits 253.61 ms 0.40 ms
RSA 4096 bits 1635.65 ms 1.43 ms
DSA 512 bits 19 ms 100 µs
DSA 1024 bits 82 ms 310 µs
Ed25519 256 bits 197 µs 226 µs
Table 5.2: Varying RSA modulus length, elliptic curve Ed25519 key size
and DSA key size for PKI attribute certificates on a Raspberry Pi
Protocol Key length createAttrCert verifyAttrCert
RSA 1024 bits 4.85 s 1.91 ms
RSA 2048 bits 24.06 s 8.33 ms
RSA 4096 bits 189.07 s 30.91 ms
DSA 512 bits 1.01 s 7.86 ms
DSA 1024 bits 1.34 s 10.36 ms
Ed25519 256 bits 25.79 ms 29.34 ms
consuming for the smart meter or any constrained device to be doing asym-
metric key cryptography often. Macaroons take much less time in compari-
son. Moreover, the number of macaroons generated is much lesser than the
number of attribute certificates, since the macaroons are not generated by a
single server for every smart home appliance. If we have n smart meters, and
m smart home appliances, in a macaroon-based scenario, the server would
generate n macaroons, and each smart meter would generate m macaroons
after attenuating them. The results are shown in the Table 5.4.
In our second set of experiments, we try to ascertain which would be
the best shared secret algorithm to set up a secure channel between any
two devices sharing a macaroon HMAC value. As discussed in the previous
section, the methods available are using a key derivation function, to generate
a key from the shared secret. These key derivation functions include the
bcrypt, scrypt and the argon2 algorithms.
The argon2 algorithm took — 0.024 s, the scrypt algorithm took — 0.78
s and the bcrypt algorithm took — 24.41 s when tested on a raspberry pi.
While we do not explicitly do a energy consumption analysis of the two
proposed schemes here, we would like to suggest that the timing analysis
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Table 5.3: Varying cryptographic hash functions for an implementation of
macaroons on a server
Hash Algorithm createMacaroon verifyMacaroon
MD5 98 µs 79 µs
SHA-1 100 µs 80 µs
SHA-256 110 µs 85 µs
Table 5.4: Varying cryptographic hash functions for an implementation of
macaroons on constrained devices
Hash Algorithm createMacaroon verifyMacaroon
Raspberry Pi
MD5 650 µs 473 µs
SHA-1 662 µs 513 µs
SHA-256 761 µs 566 µs
TCIPG research
platform
SHA-1 900 µs 780 µs
SHA-256 1.2 ms 870 µs
in fact sheds some light on the topic. While both the schemes will have
similar power draws, the total energy consumed by a scheme will in fact
be determined by the time it takes to run on the smart meter processor
and hence a faster scheme also relates to lower energy consumption, thereby
allowing smart meters to stay within the certification requirements.
In this chapter, we explored some of the identity issues for IoT devices.
We proposed two possible schemes for reliable communication in the Internet
of Things. We noted that a macaroons-based scheme is expected to scale
more reliably for the number of data points in the envisioned smart grid, by
putting decentralization and symmetric key ciphers into practice—while still
providing a lot of the flexibility of PKI-based schemes.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In the rush to deploy more and more smart devices performing interesting
tasks, we must not overlook the plumbing required to be done before deploy-
ing them. The excitement around smart devices has fuelled the consumer
market to look at exciting options to make their surroundings smarter but the
interaction between these smart devices often seem to have glaring security
holes.
In this thesis we begin by exploring how the existence of vulnerabilities in
device neighbors can lead to a bloom in attacks across the network. We then
proceeded to check if existing Internet of Computer (IoC) security schemes
scale to Internet of Things (IoT) size populations and analyze the Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate revocation mechanism. Our findings
show that revocation schemes barely work for the current size of the Internet
and will definitely face challenges as the size grows.
We then proceed to look at another question that may arise: the question
of unique identity in the IoT. We look at the namespace complexity for large
device populations.
We finally suggest two schemes that may try to solve these problems and
evaluate the schemes on a smart meter research platform to show their effi-
cacy on low memory devices.
While in this thesis, we provide a deep exploration of the problem the
solutions were just an initial glimpse at the possible solutions. We hope to,
in the future, look at:
• Developing metrics to quantify absolute security of large-scale hetero-
geneous networks. To this end we plan to explore the space of uncertain
attack graphs that model the network in the face of insufficient infor-
mation and provide various attack paths that an attacker might take
to the goal. As an example: How does a vulnerability in the smart
washing machine lead to a potential attack at the utility company?
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• Developing a large-scale simulation of the interactions between multiple
IoT nodes to see how the packets transmit through the network. Use
this to develop a better simulation of the zero-day blooms.
• How can the macaroons-based solution be used in other parts of the
smart grid. There seems to be a potential application for using such
a solution in conjunction with the MQTT protocol [57] for Industrial
Control Systems (ICS).
• Look at other aspects of SCADA systems security and check scalability
of existing protocols in such networks by using modeling frameworks
like the one we use to study certificate revocation.
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